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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU280, US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags `#cablegate` and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. `#03KATHMANDU280`.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
03KATHMANDU280	2003-02-14 05:16 2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Kathmandu	

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1538395.ece>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000280

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [IN](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NEPAL

REF: A. A. 02 NEW DELHI 6938 B. B. NEW DELHI 267 C. C. NEW DELHI 641

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASONS: 1.5 (B AND D)

1. (C) Summary: US security assistance to Nepal has brought the ancillary advantage to the US of providing a new arena for fruitful US-Indian cooperation. The US has been instrumental in helping Nepal modernize its military, and this has been welcomed by the Indian government. The Indian government has been instrumental in helping Nepal modernize its military, and this has been welcomed by the US.
2. (C) DCM and DATT met on February 4 with their Indian counterparts to discuss issues raised by the Indian Ambassador concerning US sales of weapons to Nepal. The DCM and DATT began the discussion by explaining the complexity of the US security assistance process, emphasizing that none of the money goes directly to the Nepali government.
3. (C) The Indian DCM, Ashok Kumar, agreed readily with the DCM's characterization of the speed and volume of Indian security assistance to Nepal.
4. (C) The DCM and DATT countered by explaining that the USG is not pushing M16s on the Nepali Government. After our current FMF appropriation, we will be able to provide M16s to Nepal.
5. (C) The DCM and DATT asked how the GOI proposed that the USG should approach the M16 issue with Nepal. After a pause with no answer from the Indian side, the DCM responded that the USG would have to work with the Nepali government to resolve this issue.
6. (C) The DATT asked how the GOI proposed that the USG should approach the M16 issue with Nepal. After a pause with no answer from the Indian side, the DATT responded that the USG would have to work with the Nepali government to resolve this issue.
7. (C) In conclusion the DCM pointed out that the US values its strengthening military-to-military relationship with India and has no desire to weaken it.
8. (S/NF) Comment: Our frequent discussions with our Indian diplomatic colleagues here in Kathmandu are inconsistent in tone. Ambassador Shyamal Malinowski
9. (C) On February 11 our DATT was told that the Indian Embassy had placed a hold on the delivery of additional INSAS rifles, although the Emb
10. Conclusions we tentatively have drawn from the discussion summarized above and numerous others like it are the following:
-- (C) The GOI, like the USG, is attempting to be responsive to Nepali requests for modern combat rifles as an urgent priority. What is frustrating is that the Indian analysts are increasingly persuaded that the Maoist movement in Nepal poses a security threat to India. Their dilemma is that the Indian attitudes toward US security assistance to Nepal are complex. On the one hand, they are pleased by the growing transparency and accountability of US security assistance programs.
-- (S/NF) At least in Kathmandu, Indian concern about US arms sales to Nepal appears to vary significantly between its civilian and military re
11. (C) Comment. The best information we have seen on Maoist thinking indicates that the US and UK's announced policy of military assistance to Nepal is consistent with the Indian position.

MALINOWSKI